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HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
Human Rights Quarterly 26 (2004) 330–374 © 2004 by The Johns Hopkins University Press
Human Rights Nongovernmental
Organizations and the
Problems of Transition
Christine Bell*
Johanna Keenan**
ABSTRACT
Human rights protections are often a key dimension in peace agreements
and settlements. One would expect the human rights nongovernmental
organizations who worked to ensure such protection, to play a primary role
in ensuring the implementation of human rights commitments. However,
the same transitional landscape which holds out opportunities for im-
proved human rights enforcement, also gives rise to problems for domestic
human rights NGOs. Post-agreement, patterns of conflict, the human rights
mechanisms available, and the human rights “players,” all mutate. This can
create difficulties for human rights NGOs with respect to their mandate,
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priorities, funding, recruitment, and their relationships with other groups.
This article describes and analyzes how transition affects domestic human
rights NGOs using examples from different countries. In conclusion, a
number of recommendations are made to improve human rights protection
post-conflict.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the cold war, both internal conflict and its corollary the
negotiated agreement, have come to rival inter-state conflict in terms of
deaths caused, and as a focus for concern, intervention, and study. Since
1990 over 300 peace agreements have been signed between adversaries in
over forty jurisdictions.1 These conflicts were internal in nature and fall
within three overlapping categories: centralist/revolutionary, regional/iden-
tity, and economic/criminal.2 Typically peace processes across these types
of conflict aim towards a peace agreement which documents a new
political compromise addressed at eliminating violence.
Despite the differences in the conflicts there are “design features”
common to many of the agreements. Thus, peace processes often move
towards agreements which set out a constitutional framework defining
access of different groups to power, coupled with protection of human rights
through bills of rights, human rights commissions, and new or reformed
judiciaries, police (and other military/security forces), and criminal justice
systems. The new arrangements for holding power in some cases are aimed
at moving from a failed state or an undemocratic state to coherent and
accountable political structures. In others they are aimed at including
previously excluded minority groups in government in an attempt to address
self-determination claims, through mechanisms such as territorial divisions
of power and/or consociational forms of government. In each case human
rights institutions are included, if at all, as part of a broadly liberal
democratic package, tweaked by a group-rights dimension in cases of
1. CHRISTINE BELL, PEACE AGREEMENTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2000). While some agreements are
negotiated, in other cases, such as Kosovo and East Timor, the framework for the post-
conflict stage was imposed through UN Security Council Resolutions.
2. See Mary E. Mulvihill & George A. Lopez, The Human Rights Dimensions of Peace
Accords in Internal Conflicts: Insights for a Research Design, paper prepared for the
panel of Do Good Things Go Together? Rights and Resolution at the 43rd Annual
Meetings of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, LA, 24 Mar. 2002
(copy on file with the authors). Cf. also, INTEGRATED NETWORK FOR SOCIETAL CONFLICT RESEARCH,
STATE FAILURE PROJECT: INTERNAL WARS AND FAILURES OF GOVERNANCE 1955–2001 (2003), available
at www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/stfail/sfdata.htm (categorizing revolutionary wars and
ethnic wars); WILLIAM ZARTMAN, ELUSIVE PEACE: NEGOTIATING AN END TO CIVIL WARS (1995)
(categorizing centralist and regionalist types of internal conflict).
Vol. 26332 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
ethnic conflict. There are of course exceptions to this; some framework
peace agreements sideline human rights issues, often for geo-political
reasons (see Israeli-Palestinian Oslo and Interim Agreement).3 However, for
the most part, peace agreements make provisions for human rights protection.
This article aims to initiate discussion about the pressures which
transitions from conflict exert on domestic human rights nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs). This discussion emerges from a larger ongoing cross-
jurisdictional study, and forms a preliminary summary of emerging insights.
While all transitional situations are different, the common factors of internal
conflict and a negotiated agreement, often with a human rights dimension,
mean that while specific problems will differ there are some common issues
for human rights NGOs.
The article begins by locating consideration of the relationship between
peace agreements and human rights in what is asserted to be a complex
transitional justice landscape. This context sets the scene for some of the
difficulties of transition for human rights NGOs. The article then sets out in
general terms the types of practical problems transitions raise for domestic
human rights NGOs. These problems are illustrated using a number of
examples and drawing on interviews with human rights activists and other
nongovernmental actors, in particular from Northern Ireland. The issues
raised have relevance for human rights organizations involved in transi-
tional situations, for funders, and indeed for the negotiation and design of
peace agreements themselves. It is argued that many of the practical issues
which impact human rights NGOs have their roots in the broader concep-
tual dilemmas of transition, and in particular in the highly contested and
visibly politicized role of rights discourse at such times. This article
concludes by sketching out some possible responses to the issues which
arise for a range of different actors.
A. The Difficulties of Transitions from Conflict
One would expect the human rights nongovernmental organizations, who
often played a part in ensuring that human rights provisions were inserted
into a peace agreement’s text, to have a primary role in ensuring
monitoring and lobbying for implementation of the agreement’s human
rights commitments. Indeed, this role would seem crucial given the fact
that the post-agreement terrain by mainstreaming human rights discourse
will inevitably also subject it to new political pressures and difficulties.
However, paradoxically, the very inclusion of a human rights agenda in an
3. See BELL, supra note 1.
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agreement creates a new and complex set of challenges which impact the
effectiveness of human rights NGOs. These challenges often appear as
practical. A peace agreement signals a dramatic change in the political and
legal institutions and, if moderately successful, in the scale and nature of
violent conflict itself. This affects human rights NGOs in all aspects of their
work.
The types of issues and the players they must deal with change. Patterns
of human rights abuse change, who is legally accountable may change, the
legal basis for monitoring human rights abuse may change, the field of
international and domestic human rights institutions, and of NGOs them-
selves, all may change. These shifts in turn can affect whether an NGO
continues to exist, what mandate it works under, its priorities, its ability to
recruit and retain staff, the types of intervention which it finds effective, its
funding base, and its institutional capacity.
Many of these challenges are faced by civic society in general during
transitions. Some of these difficulties are faced by human rights NGOs at
times other than transition. But these difficulties often take on a particular
complexion as regards human rights NGOs during times of transition, given
the centrality of justice institutions to the transitional landscape. It is
suggested that the conceptual complexities of the transitional justice
landscape underlie and underwrite the practical difficulties which human
rights nongovernmental organizations face in the aftermath of a peace
agreement.
Human rights protections do not enter an agreement as a result of
principled design and a clear cross-party commitment to implementing the
normative demands of international human rights law. Human rights enter
peace agreements when political elites agree to their presence. Political
elites typically disagree over whether and how human rights standards
apply during a conflict. The reasons why they agree to including human
rights standards as part of a peace agreement are many and varied,
evidencing a dialectical relationship between principle and pragmatism. A
full description of the dynamics of this relationship is beyond the scope of
this article, save to note that it results in part from a range of international
pressures on domestic parties, which propel them towards a standard set of
human rights institutions; in part from the need for compromise between
domestic parties; and in part from changing notions of “self-interest” for
local political elites with relation to human rights.4 These reasons result in
what can be argued to be a distinctive relationship between rights and
politics in transitional periods.
The very inclusion of human rights provisions in a peace agreement
4. Id.
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places human rights issues at the center of ongoing debate and controversy
as to what implementation of an agreement means and requires. Where
political institutions collapse or reach stalemate through vetoes, human
rights institutions may become the primary site of post-agreement tension
around the meaning and direction of transition. Furthermore, human rights
institutions may be the inevitable site of such tensions in any case. Ruti
Teitel has argued for a transitional understanding of legal institutional
reform, which sees such institutions as simultaneously “constituted by, and
constitutive of” transitional change.5 However, the movement of transition
in a liberalizing direction cannot be presumed.6 Opposing parties often
push for particular institutional arrangements, precisely in order to pre-
determine the direction and outcomes of transition.
Throughout a peace process, human rights NGOs, who by their very
nongovernmental nature claim not to be “doing” government, must negoti-
ate this difficult terrain. Central to the work of human rights NGOs is the
notion of accountability.7 The basic concept of human rights protection is
that governments are accountable for upholding citizens’ rights, and that
human rights NGOs have a particular role to play in ensuring that this
accountability happens. This function is fairly clear cut in times of conflict
and in times of peace. In times of transition, however, how to best achieve
accountability is more contested and a series of related dilemmas emerge
around how best to hold governmental power to account. Government and
governance will be changing in fundamental ways, posing the question for
human rights NGOs as to how they can best facilitate “human rights”
change—when does the NGO demand flexibility in pursuing human rights
claims before holding governments to account for what they have not (yet)
achieved? This dilemma has been thoroughly interrogated with respect to
how and when to deal with past human rights abuses—a particularly
difficult issue for human rights NGOs.8 However, it impacts more broadly
on a range of dilemmas relating to legal institutional change. In making any
move from adversarial critical positions as regards official processes, to
constructive engagement aimed at addressing what might work, human
5. RUTI TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 6 (2000).
6. Teitel appears to make this presumption, id. at 5. But see Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice
in a New Era, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 893 (2003) (Teitel takes a more critical stance with
respect to any assumption of a liberalizing direction to transition).
7. See Laurie S. Wiseberg, Human Rights Nongovernmental Organizations, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY: ISSUES AND ACTION, 373 (Bruce Weston & Richard Claude
eds., 1992).
8. The literature is too extensive to deal with here, but see, e.g., PRISCILLA HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE
TRUTHS (2001); IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE (Naomi Roht-
Arriaza ed., 1995); Stanley Cohen, State Crimes of Previous Regimes: Knowledge,
Accountability and the Policing of the Past, 20 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 7 (1995).
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rights NGOs must be careful not to abandon the very concept of account-
ability they seek to promote. NGOs have to learn how to co-operate without
being co-opted.
Furthermore, the political context in times of transition is different from
that of the conflict and that of peaceful liberal democracy. Crucially for
human rights NGOs, implementation of the human rights commitments of
peace agreements is not neutral as regards the parties to those agreements.9
If the commitments deliver rights in practice, this signifies a re-allocation of
power which is visibly political. If rights institutions are ineffective in
addressing ongoing human rights abuses, it signifies a failure of an element
of the peace agreement, again with highly visible political implications. In
any case, human rights lobbying will be evaluated in terms of contested
notions of what a peace agreement is designed to achieve. While enforce-
ment of human rights commitments can be analyzed to always be
“political” in a broad sense,10 outside of transitions this politics is buried in
legal processes and easy to deny. Post-agreement, political challenge
operates in a new context. That context is one where a plethora of agreed
human rights commitments and institutions are instituted over a short space
of time in a divided and politicized community looking for winners and
losers. In this context, human rights NGOs can be charged with explicitly
and directly “doing politics.”
What follows is an attempt to map some of the transitional issues which
arise for human rights NGOs. The problems of transition often appear as a
series of practical changes and challenges. In practical terms, human rights
NGOs must deal with two types of changes: changes in the human rights
issues to be addressed and changes in the players with whom to interact.
These are considered in turn. The changes play out in resultant organiza-
tional difficulties, which are then considered using examples drawn particu-
larly from Northern Ireland.
B. Human Rights NGOs: Initial Definitions
Before moving to consider these interlocking sets of changes and difficul-
ties, some definitions are called for. Human rights NGOs come in many
shapes and forms. There are a number of ways to define such groups based
on the degree to which their work addresses “human rights” issues, how
9. Eva Bertram, Reinventing Governments: The Promise and Perils of United Nations
Peacebuilding, 39 J. CONF. RES. 387 (1995).
10. See, e.g., Richard Rorty, Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality, in ON HUMAN
RIGHTS: THE OXFORD AMNESTY LECTURES 1993, 111 (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley eds.,
1993).
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they self-define, and their modes of working or types of intervention;
however, most commentators acknowledge the impossibility of definition.11
Our own research has found a three-way categorization of groups, based on
self-definition, to form a useful starting point in understanding and compar-
ing human rights NGOs.
Most centrally, for the purposes of the study, there are human rights
groups whose core mandate is the promotion and protection of human
rights, as defined internationally.12 They clearly self-identify as human rights
groups first and foremost. These groups tend to be internationally net-
worked, to have consultative status at the United Nations, or to be affiliated
with a group with such status. They work on a range of issues often affecting
a range of communities. They use characteristic modes of working such as
monitoring, reporting, lobbying, and education. It is worth noting that even
for “core mandate” human rights NGOs located in conflict situations, there
are often quite different conceptions of the relationship of human rights
work to the conflict, and different underlying motivations prompting
activists to become involved in human rights work. For some NGOs, human
rights advocacy is part and parcel of a larger struggle, for example,
democratization. For others, it is a more straightforward project of account-
ability, such as exists in any society, but made more acute given the
existence of violent conflict. These differences, which are often not evident
during a conflict, may come to the fore during a peace process where they
generate debate about the appropriate role for human rights NGOs in the
new political climate.
Beyond this “classic” form, there are a range of other groups with varied
connections to human rights. In a second category are “equality” NGOs,
whose work is focused around the equality claims of a specific marginalized
community, where the community is defined around an aspect of identity,
such as gender, sexuality, ethnicity, disability, or age. These groups may be
indistinguishable from core mandate human rights NGOs (which may not in
11. See, e.g., STANLEY COHEN, DENIAL AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT: THE IMPACT OF INFORMATION ABOUT
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS (1995) (identifying different types of human rights discourse
used); Felice D. Gaer, Reality Check: Human Rights Nongovernmental Organizations
Confronting Governments at the UN, 16 THIRD WORLD Q. 389 (1995) (using a distinction
between human rights with primary goals of monitoring and reporting of government
behavior, and those with broader goals, but noting the impossibility of classification);
Leon Gordenker & Thomas G. Weiss, NGO Participation in the International Policy
Process, 16 THIRD WORLD Q. 543 (1995) (looking at function as basis for definition,
noting the impossibility of an immutable definition); Paul F. Ramshaw, Ethical
Investment: Retail Ethics and Participatory Democracy? 29 CAMBRIAN L. REV. 105 (1998)
(noting impossibility of definition); Wiseberg, supra note 7 (drawing distinction between
“ideal” or “exclusive” human rights NGOs, and NGOs with broader goals but which
devote substantial resources to human rights struggle).
12. Cf. Wiseberg, supra note 7; COHEN, supra note 11.
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practice be as inclusive as their mandate suggests) in their ways of working,
but will self-define with primary reference to equality for a constituency
from whom their main membership is drawn rather than to human rights.
In a third category are groups whose core mandate is something other
than “human rights,” but where the group sees human rights as either a sub-
issue within their broader mandate, or a way of characterizing their work.
This covers a broad range of very different groups, from those dealing with
issues such as democracy or development, to single issue groups, such as
campaigns against land mines or plastic bullets, or for adequate housing.
Groups dealing with the needs of victims, or ex-prisoners, or refugees, can
be included in this category.
This study focuses on the impact of transition on groups in the first
category: “core mandate” human rights NGOs. The broader landscape of
human rights NGOs, however, remains relevant to that focus in several
ways. First, the proliferation of groups who could be described in some
sense as “human rights NGOs” and the very difficulties of defining what
constitutes a human rights NGO itself indicates an expansion in the human
rights project. Human rights are increasingly broadly defined to cover civil,
political, social, economic and cultural, and now a range of third generation
“solidarity” rights. Furthermore, the perceived strength of rights claims as
opposed to merely “political” claims, coupled with the international
legitimacy of human rights discourse, means that “human rights” is
increasingly seen as a useful label under which to do business.
This trend, which can be identified globally,13 is often accentuated in
times of transition where human rights discourse moves in a short space of
time from being marginalized to being mainstreamed. Proliferation of
“human rights NGOs” is one of the very changes which must be considered
as part of the transitional justice landscape, and it is for this reason that self-
definition has centrally been used in identifying “human rights NGOs” for
this study. However, it should also be pointed out that the use of self-
definition is also problematic in including as human rights NGOs groups
who use the label “human rights” as part of an essentially “supremacist”
paradigm which conflicts with human rights standards. This will be dealt
with as also important to the transitional justice landscape.
II. CHANGES IN THE ISSUES
A peace process and peace agreement often mark a distinct set of changes
to which human rights NGOs must respond. While the general patterns are
13. See Peter Van Tuijl, Entering the Global Dealing Room: Reflections on a Rights-Based
Framework for NGOs in International Development, 21 THIRD WORLD Q. 621 (2000).
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predictable, the precise issues arising are not, and cannot therefore be
planned for. Human rights issues change over time in any jurisdiction,
whether it is experiencing conflict or not. However, these changes will be
dramatic in a jurisdiction experiencing violent conflict which embarks upon
a peace process resulting in a cease-fire and a framework peace agreement.
A. Changes in Patterns of Conflict Violence
Changes in patterns of violence produce changes in the human rights issues
which must be addressed by human rights NGOs. The initial aim of a peace
process is usually to get a cease-fire in which further negotiations can take
place.14 A cease-fire will change patterns of violence, and with it patterns of
human rights abuse. These changes are often a result of attempts to limit the
conflict to enable military players to come to the negotiating table, and to
build confidence in the peace process. Some prevalent forms of human
rights abuse, such as arbitrary killing, disappearances, and torture, will
greatly diminish or disappear, and subsequently the peace process may
begin to deliver structural changes that prevent other abuses, such as lifting
emergency legislation or outlawing the death penalty.15 Limits on the
conflict will often be accompanied by independent monitoring, either of
human rights abuses and/or the cease-fire itself.16 As the process progresses,
these types of changes will be consolidated and eventually confirmed and
extended by a framework peace agreement aimed at institutionalizing
structures aimed at ending the violent conflict.
However, the changes in conflict during a peace process are not one-
way from more to less violent. Negotiations may bring particularly violent
periods of conflict, as the South African conflict illustrated. Those involved
in a process may attempt to make gains at the negotiating table by dramatic
military actions away from it. Thus violence aimed at population transfer or
consolidating power bases may be characteristic of this period. Those who
stay outside the process to “outbid” those within may also embark on
violent sprees aimed less at strategic goals and more at general political
14. Not all peace processes follow this pattern. For example, in the El Salvador process, the
human rights agreement preceded the cease-fire. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE LOST
AGENDA: HUMAN RIGHTS AND UN FIELD OPERATIONS 13 (1993).
15. See, e.g., the preliminary agreements in the South African peace process, documented
in BELL, supra note 1, at 46–47.
16. See, e.g., Agreement on Human Rights, 26 July 1990, El Sal.–FMLN, in THE UNITED
NATIONS AND EL SALVADOR 1990–1995, 4 UNITED NATIONS BLUE BOOK SERIES 108–109 (1995),
UN Doc. NO. A/44/971-S/21541; Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights, 29
Mar. 1994, Guat.-UNRG, available at www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/agreements/pdf/
guat13.pdf.
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destabilization and maximizing division between communities. This strat-
egy can result in violence which is more random and which targets broader
sections of the community and in particular civilian populations. The
project of monitoring human rights violations and/or violations of the cease-
fire can become a critical project, taking up significant time and costs. The
distinction between human rights monitoring and cease-fire monitoring can
become unclear, with pressures towards “balancing” condemnation with
relation to the different sides in the conflict, regardless of imbalances in who
is actually using violence.17
The very existence of a peace process may also, paradoxically, increase
the threat to human rights defenders. With political and military leaders
being unable to be seen to attack their counterparts, targeting may shift to
those perceived as promoting opposition agendas more generally. Thus
targeting may be focused against those who are critical and effective, rather
than those who are politically engaged or linked to violence. The murder of
defense solicitor and human rights defender Rosemary Nelson after the
Belfast Agreement in 1999 in Northern Ireland provides some evidence of
this type of dynamic. In the very different context of post-Taliban Afghani-
stan, Caroline Moorehead has noted how aid workers “once respected as
neutral players” have been made the target of attack by rebel armies whose
presence blurs any distinction between war zone and zone of relief.18
The signing of a peace agreement will seldom herald the end of
conflict, even in a relatively successful peace process. While violent
manifestations of conflict may change, they rarely simply end. Little work
has been done describing or establishing measurements of change in
patterns of violence. The South African transition has a much clearer
beginning and end than other transitions, and was successful in ending the
apartheid conflict as then understood. However, the rise of violent crime
and security responses to it, together with continuing political violence, for
example in Kwazulu-Natal, poses the question of whether the conflict has
ended or just mutated.19 Furthermore, if the notion of violence is expanded,
17. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 14, at 13–35 (criticizing UN (ONUSAL) human
rights monitoring in El Salvador for refusing to condemn government human rights
abuses, under constraint of its mediation role).
18. Caroline Moorehead, At the Limits of Aid, 32 INDEX ON CENSORSHIP 148, 154 (2003).
19. Interview with Graeme Simpson, Executive Director, Centre for the Study of Violence
and Reconciliation, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (Aug. 2003) (citing CSVR’s research as
indicating that there has not been an increase in violence post-apartheid, but rather a
change in violence perceived as socially functional and political, to violence as anti-
social and criminal). See further, Brandon Hamber & Sharon Lewis, An Overview of the
Consequences of Violence and Trauma in South Africa (1997), available at
www.csvr.org.za/papers/papptsd.htm; Brandon Hamber, Have No Doubt it is Fear in
the Land: An Overview of the Continuing Cycles of Violence in South Africa, 12 S. AFR.
J. CHILD & ADOLESCENT HEALTH 5, 5–18 (2000) (both dealing with patterns of post-apartheid
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as Johan Galtung expands it, to “structural violence” involving denial of
socio-economic goods such as food, housing, and education, the conflict
may remain strongly in evidence, as South Africa also demonstrates.20 Post-
agreement old patterns of violence may linger, albeit to a lesser extent or in
a mutated way. Yet, whether a human rights response is necessary, and what
that response should be, may be less clear.
B. Changes in Patterns of “Other” Violence
A peace process and agreement may change patterns of human rights
abuses in other ways. Post-agreement, human rights abuses which were
obscured by the dynamics of violent conflict, such as racist attacks or
violence against women in the home, may increase, or at least become
more visible.21 Indeed, it is often difficult to quantify whether the end of the
dominant conflict increases levels of “non-conflict” violence, or merely
appears to. Cease-fires may create a space within which other forms of
violence can be reported, by individuals to the authorities, or by the media.
Alternately, diverse and new patterns of violence may well be the conse-
quence of a society brutalized by a legacy of violence. Activists in Northern
Ireland, for example, argue that crimes against ethnic minorities such as the
Chinese community have increased post-agreement, and changed in their
patterns.22 Similarly, there have been suggestions that domestic violence has
increased post-agreement.23
As the reactive priorities created by violent conflict fall away, they
reveal a more diffuse landscape of human rights abuses. Changing patterns
in violence and human rights abuses post-agreement create difficult choices
violence); see also Brandon Hamber, Dr Jekyll and Mr Hide: Problems of Violence
Prevention and Reconciliation in South Africa’s Transition to Democracy, in VIOLENCE IN
SOUTH AFRICA: A VARIETY OF PERSPECTIVES 349 (Elirea Bronman et al. eds., 1997) available at
www.csvr.org/za/papers/papjeck; Alex Butchart et al., From Violent Policy to Policies
for Violence Prevention: Violence, Politics and Mental Health in Twentieth Century
South Africa, in MENTAL HEALTH POLICY ISSUES FOR SOUTH AFRICA (Don Foster et al. eds., 1997)
available at www.csvr.org.za/papers/papbh&ab (both papers making links between post
and pre-apartheid violence); ADRIAN GUELKE, SOUTH AFRICA IN TRANSITION: THE MISUNDERSTOOD
MIRACLE 45–66 (1999) (documenting the levels of violence and some of the causal factors
during the transition).
20. JOHAN GALTUNG, PEACE BY PEACEFUL MEANS: PEACE AND CONFLICT, DEVELOPMENT AND CIVILIZATION 197
(1996).
21. See Jenny Pearce, From Civil War to “Civil” Society: Has the End of the Cold War
Brought Peace to Central America? 74 INT’L AFF. 587, 591 (1998).
22. Interview with Patrick Yu, Director, Northern Ireland Council for Ethnic Minorities, in
Belfast, N. Ir. (Jan. 2002).
23. Interview with Staff Member, Women’s Aid, in Derry, N. Ir. (Dec. 2002).
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for NGOs and new human rights institutions over how to prioritize their
interventions. In particular, there is a tension between extending mandates
to go beyond the traditional “conflict-related” issues and the need for
continued pressure around “conflict related” human rights abuses.
C. New Constituencies, New Human Needs, and New Human Rights
The existence of the peace process may itself give rise to new human rights
issues requiring attention from human rights NGOs. Victims’ needs, for
example, frequently emerge or are articulated differently consequent to a
peace agreement. While victims will have existed throughout a conflict,
evidence suggests that often a cease-fire or peace process proves a cathartic
moment, galvanizing victim responses. Emotions and needs which have
been submerged during the conflict can be triggered both by an increasingly
safe climate in which to talk about the experience of victimhood, and/or by
the compromises of the peace process itself. Victims who had accepted their
victimhood as a sacrifice to a larger goal may be forced to re-evaluate if this
goal is not achieved in the political compromise. Similarly, issues such as
prisoner release, or those responsible for the conflict being given a place at
the negotiating table, may also cause such a re-evaluation.
Victim disillusionment with peace processes may go deeper than this.
Pain which could be endured in a conflict situation as part of a common
suffering may be harder to endure at conflict’s end, when it becomes clear
that not everyone has suffered equally. In Northern Ireland, one of the most
significant dimensions of the peace process has been the rise of a “victims
agenda” and the emergence of a range of victims groups representing victim
needs and conflicting victim perspectives on the peace process.24 As Mike
Morrissey and Marie Smyth note, the polarization of victim issues coincided
with early release of prisoners; although they suggest that this perhaps
“crystallized” rather than caused the polarization.25
Peace process mechanisms designed to deal with the past, such as truth
commissions, will create new needs for NGO support, but also may
themselves create new trauma. Brandon Hamber and Richard A. Wilson
note that “nation-building discourses of truth commissions homogenize
disparate individual memories to create an official version, and in so doing
24. See, e.g., Relatives For Justice, available at www.relativesforjustice.com; SAVER/
NAVER, available at saver-naver.rosa.ie; Families Acting for Innocent Relatives, avail-
able at www.victims.org.uk. Details of other victims organizations, available at http://
www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/violence/victims/victimgroups.htm.
25. MIKE MORRISSEY & MARIE SMYTH, NORTHERN IRELAND AFTER THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT: VICTIMS,
GRIEVANCE AND BLAME 8 (2002).
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they repress other forms of psychological closure motivated by less
ennobled (although no less real) emotions of anger and vengeance.”26
Expecting victims to give up retributive desires in favor of reconciling
narratives may not contribute to their “healing” at all. Furthermore, this new
trauma may itself be considered a human rights abuse—provision for
impunity is often accused of running counter to treaty-based and customary
human rights law.27 Resultant debates about the tensions between “justice
and peace” or “impunity and reconciliation,” have proved difficult for
human rights NGOs.28
Other new constituencies may be created by the peace agreement, such
as returned refugees and displaced persons, or those seeking return, and ex-
combatants or ex-prisoners. These groups will have a spectrum of needs
with human rights implications. The reintegration of refugees, displaced
persons, ex-prisoners or ex-combatants into the reconstructing society raises
issues around housing and land rights, socio-economic well-being, personal
security, and discrimination.29 Failure to address these needs may ignite the
conflict in two converse ways. Either it may enable the conflict to continue
through continued acts of violence against these groups, and/or these
groups may themselves become involved in ongoing patterns of violence
and human rights abuse as members of dissident groups, or through
increased domestic violence, or organized crime. Human rights NGOs in
the broadest sense, may be faced with choices over how far they should
enter the service provision field and meet needs directly—for which funding
will often be readily available—or the extent to which they should remain in
an advocacy/campaigning role. The two will not always be compatible.
Finally, new human rights abuses may enter the field with the entry of
peace-keepers and the international community itself. Problems of account-
ability of international personnel involved in governance more generally
have emerged in Bosnia, and to a greater extent in the United Nations
administrations in Kosovo and East Timor.30 Problems of trafficking against
women, sexual slavery and rape have all been well documented as issues
that accompany armies, including peace-keepers.31 International personnel
26. Brandon Hamber & Richard A. Wilson, Symbolic Closure Through Memory, Reparation
and Revenge in Post-conflict Societies, 1 J. HUM. RTS. 35, 36 (2002).
27. See, e.g., Diane F. Orentlichter, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2541–2551 (1991).
28. See references, supra note 8.
29. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S REFUGEES:
A HUMANITARIAN AGENDA 159–64 (1997).
30. See CONFLICT SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT GROUP, KING’S COLLEGE, LONDON, A Review of Peace
Operations: A Case for Change (2003), available at ipi.sspp.kcl.ac.uk (in particular
country reports); see also Joel C. Beauvais, Note, Benevolent Despotism: A Critique of
U.N. State-building in East Timor, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1101 (2001).
31. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, WOMEN FACING WAR (2001).
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involved in human rights and humanitarian aid work do not emerge
unscathed. As Moorehead notes, much of the money pledged to reconstruc-
tion in Afghanistan “has gone on paying salaries and on the international
community itself”; whether true or not, “[r]umours of greed, exploitation
and straightforward inefficiency abound.”32 For domestic human rights
NGOs, the holding of international actors to account is difficult legally, but
also given capacity constraints, and the dependency of their relationship to
international actors.
D. Changes to Who is Abusing Who
Who is abusing who may also change throughout a peace process and
particularly on the signing of a peace agreement, both as a practical matter,
but also as a technical legal matter. New territorial boundaries, in the form
of new state or internal borders, can create new minorities, and/or establish
what were armed opposition groups in power as state actors. The entity
division in Bosnia Herzegovina into the Republika Srpska and the Federa-
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in confirming new boundaries confirmed
new minorities, who were more likely to experience exclusion, domination,
and discrimination.33 In the Israeli/Palestinian peace process, the creation of
the Palestinian Authority (PA), with a degree of autonomy in certain areas,
gave a governmental role to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
Allegations of PLO abuses against Palestinians, such as the torture and
murder of informers, had always pertained; however governmental capacity
fundamentally changed the human rights picture. The holding of power and
responsibility for matters such as policing, criminal justice, and detention,
created a new spectrum of human rights abuses perpetrated by the PA/PLO,
and an increased need and opportunity for traditional notions of govern-
mental accountability to apply.34
E. Changes in What Can be Done about Human Rights Abuses
More technically, as conflict decreases, the international mechanisms for
raising human rights concerns will usually change. The humanitarian law
32. Moorehead, supra note 18, at 152.
33. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP: SARAJEVO, IS DAYTON FALLING? BOSNIA FOUR YEARS AFTER THE
PEACE AGREEMENT (28 Oct. 1999) available at www.monde-diplomatique.fr/cahier/kosovo/
bosnie-icgoct99-en.
34. See, e.g., B’TSELEM, OSLO, BEFORE AND AFTER: THE STATUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES (1999) available at www.btselem.org/english/publications/summaries/oslo_
before_and_after_1999.asp.
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regime may become less clearly applicable, or clearly not applicable, and
human rights norms more applicable, as treaties are signed and derogations
lifted. A peace agreement and/or a change in regime often results in the
undertaking of new international human rights commitments, including
ratification of treaties. The Dayton Peace Agreement purported to incorpo-
rate thirteen human rights conventions into domestic law.35 In South Africa
the six main international human rights conventions have all been signed,
acceded to, or ratified since 1994.36 Even in Northern Ireland, where most
of the major human rights treaties had long been ratified, the peace process
saw the ratification of the Council of Europe’s 1995 Framework Convention
on National Minorities and the two 1977 Protocols to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions on 28 January 1998, in the run up to the Belfast Agreement.37
The move towards human rights law, while reflecting a move towards
increased human rights standards, will often leave monitoring of non-state
forces in unclear legal territory.
Furthermore, which legal regime applies to whom may be extremely
unclear both in practice and in law. The very shifting of power through
35. See generally Dayton Peace Accords, Annex 4: Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
signed in Paris Dec. 14, 1995, Bosn. & Herz.-Croat.-Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; see
also Dayton Peace Accords, Annex 6: Agreement on Human Rights, signed in Paris
Dec. 14, 1995, Bosn. & Herz.-Republika Srpska (reiterates the commitment to the
European Convention on Human Rights and its protocols, and the list of international
human rights and humanitarian law instruments).
36. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 16 Dec.
1966, G.A. Res. 2200(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 3 Jan. 1976) ratified by South Africa 3 Oct.
1994; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A.
Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 23 Mar. 1976, Optional Protocols I and II acceded to
28 Aug. 2002) ratified by South Africa 10 Mar. 1999; International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted 21 Dec. 1965, 660 U.N.T.S.
195 (entered into force 4 Jan. 1969), reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966) communication
mechanism recognized by South Africa 9 Jan. 1999; Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted 18 Dec. 1979, G.A. Res. 34/180,
U.N. GAOR 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/36 (1980) (entered into force 3
Sept. 1981), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980) ratified by South Africa 14 Jan. 1996
(Optional Protocol not ratified); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted 10 Dec. 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N.
GAOR 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1985) (entered into force 26 June
1987), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), substantive changes noted in 24 I.L.M. 535
(1985) communication mechanism recognized by South Africa 9 Jan. 1999; Convention
on the Rights of the Child, adopted 20 Nov. 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th
Sess., Supp., No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989) (entered into force 2 Sept. 1990),
reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989) ratified by South Africa 16 Jul. 1995 (Optional
Protocol on Armed Conflict signed Feb 8 2002).
37. This was not acknowledged to be a peace agreement development.
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gradual processes, and novel interim arrangements for administering peoples
and territory, may produce governance which does not “fit” into the
international law’s assumption of unitary states who sign treaty commit-
ments. This is perhaps most dramatically illustrated by the new UN Interim
Administrations in Kosovo and East Timor, where the accountability under
human rights law of the United Nations, of any residual state, and of a range
of other groups and nongovernmental actors who undertake de facto
government and sometimes judicial or legislative functions, is unclear.
However, this problem is not confined to UN administrations. In the Israel/
Palestine peace process, post-Oslo, there was strenuous debate about the
extent to which the Agreements had “ended occupation” and, with it, the
applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention 1949.38 Relatedly, the
ambiguous international legal status of the Palestinian Authority, coupled
with questions over whether Israel remained an “occupier” in autonomous
areas, meant that it was unclear who was responsible for human rights
violations and indeed who, if anyone, could sign human rights conventions
with regard to the autonomous areas.39
Most significantly perhaps, the role of advocating and monitoring
human rights protections is also changed as new domestic remedies
become available. A range of national institutions and domestic mecha-
nisms are often established in a peace agreement in an attempt to prevent
the human rights abuses of the past re-occurring in the future. These
institutions create new issues and new lines of work for human rights
NGOs, as discussed below (III). At the very least, using these mechanisms
becomes necessary to exhaust domestic remedies en route to international
human rights enforcement.
III. CHANGE IN THE “PLAYERS”
Related to the changes in issues, are changes in the “players” with whom
human rights NGOs must engage, both domestically and internationally.
38. See, e.g., Eyal Benevinisti, The Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles: A Frame-
work for Future Settlement, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 542 (1963); Colm Campbell, A Problematic
Peace: International Humanitarian Law and the Israeli/Palestinian Peace Process, in
NATIONALISM, MINORITIES AND DIASPORAS: IDENTITIES AND RIGHTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 39 (Kristen
Schulze et al. eds., 1996); Paul Malanczuck, Some Basic Aspects of the Agreements
Between Israel and the PLO from the Perspective of International Law, 7 EUR. J. INT’L L.
485 (1996).
39. See BELL, supra note 1, at 186.
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A. New Governmental Structures
As already discussed, peace agreement provisions for constitutional settle-
ment will usually create new levels of government (for example, federal,
confederal, provincial, and even city) with which NGOs must interact. This
increases the numbers of politicians, bringing new personnel who may have
new approaches to holding political power, and new layers of government
to deal with. The new political dispensation may hold new political
problems. Human rights work will no longer be related to regime change,
but will represent an ongoing move towards accountability through emerg-
ing liberal democratic structures. Where a clear transfer of power has taken
place, NGOs who once worked alongside opposition politicians and groups
as part of a common project such as “democratization,” will be faced with
monitoring former colleagues and reconceptualizing the link between
human rights and the political sphere.
“Old friends” are often surprised and very unwilling to be monitored,
after all they were the “good guys” during the conflict. Whatever the
motivation of human rights activists, politicians espousing human rights
during conflict almost invariably see human rights as instrumental to power
changes, often failing to think through the future consequences for them-
selves should they attain power. Luis Roniger and Mario Sznajder, in
reviewing the long-term human rights implications of Southern Cone Latin
American peace processes, have noted that a decade or more on, continued
threats of instability and new human rights violations have been the
consequence of a failure to implement human rights practices post democ-
racy.40 This failure occurred despite widespread acceptance of human rights
language throughout the peace processes. The view of human rights
advocacy as instrumental to regime change led such advocacy to falter post
democratization.
Debates about the relationship between rights and politics, long the
stuff of philosophical debate, will often come to the fore in the guise of
popular debates over the place and role of human rights in the new order,
and the relationship between civil society (including human rights NGOs)
and the new government. South Africa again provides an illustration of how
such debates can work to complicate and undermine the role of human
rights NGOs. The consolidation of ANC power which took place after the
second democratic elections led to assertions that the human rights agenda
could now be forwarded by ANC politicians in power, and that the need for
civic society and NGOs had subsided. Indeed, in a speech that brought this
40. LUIS RONIGER & MARIO SZNAJDER, THE LEGACY OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN CONE:
ARGENTINA, CHILE AND URUGUAY 312 (1999).
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to a head, Mandela—a “human rights”–friendly politician—made an un-
precedented attack on NGOs, alleging that “many of our nongovernmental
organizations are not in fact NGO’s, both because they have no popular
base and the actuality that they rely on the domestic and foreign govern-
ments, rather than the people, for their material sustenance.”41 This was to
trigger ongoing debate as to the role and direction of civic society. Similar
tensions emerged between the PLO/PA and Palestinian human rights NGOs.
Key human rights activists soon found themselves detained by the PLO, and
a tussle began over a draft basic law relating to NGOs. By 1999 an external
audit of “rule of law” funding was used by a PA official to argue that human
rights NGOs were working to an externally funded agenda and were
corrupt, in what amounted to not only an attempt to undermine human
rights NGOs, but also to detract from PA corruption.42
Where the agreement institutes newly democratic government and a
legislature which purports to be accountable, entirely new forms of NGO
intervention become possible and also necessary. The work of many human
rights NGOs in South Africa post-transition had a clear focus on education
and on assisting groups to access legislative processes. Matters such as
proofing draft laws, ensuring the openness and accessibility of legislative
processes, and public education, emerge as post-agreement issues and will
require new skills and forms of intervention from NGOs. In particular, they
may require a partnership approach with government which differs from the
confrontational tactics of both human rights groups and opposition groups
during the conflict.
However, other changes may impact on the ability to foster a “partner-
ship” approach. The relationship between NGOs and the civil service will
in all likelihood also be affected. Some agreements, such as that in South
Africa, provide for reform of the civil service.43 Reform aside, new layers of
government often produce additional civil servants, and even if they do not,
new politicians are likely to bring some new party-political appointments.
This may enable new partnerships as NGO actors move into the civil
service, as they did in South Africa. More negatively, human rights NGOs
may find that their knowledge and expertise in terms of informal contacts,
sources of information, means of effective intervention, and mechanisms for
raising concerns, are virtually erased within a short time space.
41. Report by the President of the ANC, Nelson Mandela to the 50th National Conference
of the African National Congress, 16 Dec. 1997, available at www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/
history/conf/conference50/presaddress.html; see further, SANGOCO/INTERFUND, Does
Development Have to be Democratic?: Community, Accountability and the Voluntary
Sector in South Africa, 2 DEVELOPMENT UPDATE (1998) (volume dealing with the debate
around civic society in the wake of Mandela’s speech).
42. BELL, supra note 1, at 204 n.51.
43. See S. AFR. CONST. OF 1993, ch. 13, § 210 (Interim Constitution).
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B. New Human Rights and Justice Institutions
New legal and human rights institutions also provide new structures with
which human rights NGOs must interact, as touched on above. National
institutions for promoting and protecting rights are typically established to
take on a form of human rights enforcement. Human rights NGOs will have
to work out a relationship with these bodies, which often occupy a
conceptually difficult space between governmental and nongovernmental
spheres.44 Peter Van Tuijl has noted that even when a national human rights
commission is ineffective, its existence can open up space for NGOs to talk
about human rights.45 However, these national institutions, paradoxically,
may prove difficult to engage with as turf wars and mutual fears over
independence—of NGO and institution from each other, and of each from
“government”—are worked out.
In Northern Ireland, the relationship between the new Human Rights
Commission and human rights NGOs was a matter of internal and external
debate. Some (particularly from the Unionist community) criticized the appoint-
ment of members from the main human rights NGO,46 and later a  report
indicated that “there is some evidence that [the Commission] attempted . . . to
detach itself a little from these individuals and organisations, in a sense being
embarrassed of its connection.”47 A similar wish to distance their work from
that of NGOs was in evidence in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in
South Africa.48 Rachel Murray, evaluating the Human Rights Commission in
South Africa, has noted a tension between viewing a Commission as different
from a human rights NGO, and therefore to be distanced from NGO activity,
and viewing a Commission’s legitimacy as integrally connected to the
strength of its relationship with human rights NGOs.49 NGOs will usually
44. For a critique of national institutions including examination of relationship to human
rights NGOs, see INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, PERFORMANCE AND LEGITIMACY:
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS (2000).
45. Van Tuijl, supra note 13, at 623.
46. See HOUSE OF LORDS, HOUSE OF COMMONS, JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, WORK OF THE
NORTHERN IRELAND HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION; FOURTEENTH REPORT, 2002–03, 14 (HL Paper
132, CH 142), available at www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200203/jtselect/jtrights/
132/2112801.htm.
47. STEPHEN LIVINGSTONE ET AL., EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSIONS: THE NORTHERN IRELAND HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION WITH COMPARISONS FROM SOUTH
AFRICA’S REPORT FOR THE NUFFIELD FOUNDATION, INTERIM FINDINGS OF RESEARCH 27 (Oct. 2003) (copy
on file with the authors).
48. Interview with Brandon Hamber, former Manager of Truth and Reconciliation Unit,
Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, Johannesburg, in Belfast, N. Ir. (July
2003).
49. Rachel Murray, Lessons from the South African Human Rights Commission: An
Examination of a National Human Rights Institution 30–32 (2003) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors).
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wish to play some role in ensuring the effectiveness of bodies such as human
rights commissions, and this will involve testing their effectiveness by passing
on concerns and liaising with them over interventions, while also critiquing
their performance. The dual role of NGO as partner and monitor itself can
lead to tensions between NGO and national institution. Where national
institution members are also members of human rights NGOs, there may also
be internal tensions for both national institution and NGO.
While national institutions offer the possibility of long-term improved
human rights protection, in the short term they may not deliver much
change at all and, in fact, may complicate an NGO’s day-to-day work of
addressing human rights abuses. Peace agreements which produce institu-
tions as a result of negotiations seldom do so entirely coherently. Many
different institutions may be provided for, such as in South Africa where
there were six institutions established as “state Institutions Supporting
Constitutional Democracy.”50 The mandates of different human rights
institutions may overlap with institutions replicated at national and regional
levels. In Bosnia, a Constitutional Court was provided, but also a Human
Rights Commission, divided into an Ombudsman, with reporting powers,
and a Human Rights Chamber, with investigation and decisionmaking
powers. The Ombudsman, the Human Rights Chamber, and the Constitu-
tional Court all had jurisdiction over human rights issues with unclear
delimitation between them.51 Further complicating this were the institutions
at the entity level, such as the Federation Ombudsman, Federation Consti-
tutional Court, Federation Human Rights Court (whose establishment was
repeatedly opposed by the international community),52 the Republika
Srpska Constitutional Court, and Republika Srpska Ombudsman.53 These
institutions had different but overlapping mandates and different rules as to
50. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 9. These institutions are: the Public Protector; the Human Rights
Commission; the Commission for the Promotion of and Protection of the Rights of
Cultural, Religious, and Linguistic Communities; the Commission for Gender Equality;
the Auditor-General; the Electoral Commission, and the independent authority to
regulate broadcasting.
51. BOSN. & HERZ. CONST. art. VI (providing for Constitutional Court); and Annex 6:
Agreement on Human Rights, Dec. 14, 1995 (providing for Commission on Human
Rights).
52. See, e.g., Opinion On The Setting Up Of The Human Rights Court Of The Federation Of
Bosnia And Herzegovina, Venice Commission, 31st Plenary, Doc. No. CDL (1997)
021rev, available at www.venice.coe.int/; Opinion On The Reform Of Judicial Protection
Of Human Rights In The Federation Of Bosnia And Herzegovina, Venice Commission,
41st Plenary, Doc. No. CDL (1999) 078, available at www.venice.coe.int/.
53. For Federation institutions, see FED’N OF BOSN. & HERZ. CONST. Ch. II, § B; ch. IV, § C(5).
For Republika Srpska institutions, see REPUBLIKA SRPSKA CONST. ch. IX; Republic Srpska
Government Law on RS Ombudsman, Banja Luka, Oct. 1999, available at http://
www.omnieurope.info/uk/gesetz_bosnia_reg_uk.htm.
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who could access them, thus presenting a confusing set of choices for
victims and activists.
NGOs may find that new institutions mean that it is unclear where to
take a case, and that they have to pursue cases through several different fora
simultaneously. While this may serve to clarify the role of new institutions in
the medium-to-long-run, in the short-run it impacts not only negatively on
the new institution, but also on the perceived effectiveness of the human
rights NGO in terms of its own client base. In Northern Ireland and South
Africa the broad mandate of the Human Rights Commissions where almost
anything could potentially be framed as a “human rights” issue meant that
both Commissions had to work out the boundaries between their work and
that of other national institutions with rights mandates. Memoranda of
understanding have been signed with a range of other statutory bodies, but
not always in a timely or adequate manner. In Northern Ireland, for
example, applicants to the Commission for financial assistance for human
rights cases, who would have been entitled to legal aid in the absence of a
Commission, found themselves bounced between the Commission and the
Legal Aid Board because both had a criteria for funding which specified
refusal of funds if there was another, better placed funding body.54 This was
not addressed by the relevant memorandum of understanding until three
and a half years into the Commission’s operation, and even then were
charged as being ineffective.55 In South Africa, memoranda of understand-
ing were criticized for dealing with technical matters only and failing to
encapsulate a clear strategic direction for the human rights commission.56
Such memoranda are not always available publicly, or to the relevant
NGOs.
New legal institutional provisions, as with new political institutions,
may create new types of work. Peace agreements tend to provide a broad
brushstroke approach to institution-building, leaving the details to be
fleshed out in post-agreement negotiations. Thus, human rights NGOs may
become involved in inputting to the design of bills of rights, or criminal
justice systems, judicial reform, or public education around the new human
rights protections and how to use them. A range of temporary bodies may be
created with whom the NGO needs to quickly establish working relation-
ships. In South Africa, the Constitutional Assembly with its different
54. See NORTHERN IRELAND HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE REQUIRED BY
SECTION 69(2) OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND ACT 1998, 21 (2001).
55. Memorandum of Understanding between the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commis-
sion and the Legal Aid Department for Northern Ireland (Sept. 2002) (on file with
authors); See Murray, supra note 49 (noting that memoranda of understanding have
been signed in South Africa with the so-called ‘Chapter 9 Institutions’).
56. See Murray, supra note 49, at 20.
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committees, and in Northern Ireland, the Patten Commission on Policing
and the Criminal Justice Review Group, provide examples.
Truth and Reconciliation mechanisms are another example of commis-
sions with finite tasks and duration. NGOs’ interventions will include
lobbying around their remits before formation, interacting with them, and
lobbying for or against the implementation of any recommendations they
make. This type of work will often involve the NGO re-imagining its work
and using its practical knowledge as to how human rights abuses are
enabled so as to imagine the institutional reforms necessary for preventing
them in the future. It represents a shift in emphasis from reactive advocacy
work to pro-active lobbying and “academic” type work, which may draw
the NGO into debates which are highly “political.” This type of work is not
always easy to create space for and requires some vision and leaps of faith
for both the NGO and funders. However, it may be crucial not only to
building the human rights dimension to a peace process, but also to
facilitating agreement between opposing positions. In Northern Ireland, the
Committee on the Administration of Justice’s (CAJ) input in policing
discussions forms a good example of both leaps of faith and positive
outcomes from making those leaps.
The CAJ had long been engaged in lobbying for changes to policing as
a response to human rights abuses. The context of the peace process made
change more likely. As Research Officer Maggie Beirne noted:
After the republican and loyalist cease-fires were announced debates took place
around the need to reform policing. These debates focused around polarities of
“disband the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC)” to “do nothing it is fine
already.” CAJ decided at the end of 1994, beginning of 1995, that we should
commission a piece of international comparative research to focus on how best
to design police forces which conform to human rights standards as a useful
contribution to the debate. However it took some time to get funding, ages to
get researchers appointed, and a lot longer than we thought to do the work. In
the meantime the peace process collapsed and no one was talking about
policing. We worried about bringing out the report and it being a dead-letter,
but we carried on regardless saying it is a useful piece of research and perhaps
people will return to it. Eventually the report “Human Rights on Duty” was
published at the end of 1997, which turned out to be just four months before the
Good Friday Agreement was signed and reform of policing was included. We
were then in the position of being really clear about what we wanted and
impacting on debates. But in ways this was planned, and in ways the timing was
accidental.57
57. Interview with Maggie Beirne, Research and Policy Officer, Committee on the
Administration of Justice, in Belfast, N. Ir. (May 2002).
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In focusing on human rights concerns, the resultant report “Human
Rights on Duty,” touched on issues key to broader debates of composition,
training, legal and democratic accountability, police structures, and polic-
ing in transition.58 In providing models of how change had been achieved in
other situations it played an important role in shaping the Patten recommen-
dations but, more than that, has since been widely used in many processes
beyond that of Northern Ireland, such as East Timor, Guyana, Mozambique
and Sri Lanka.
C. Changes in the NGO landscape
A peace agreement may also be linked to changes in the human rights NGO
landscape itself. Mainstreaming of human rights discourse may dramatically
increase the number of human rights NGOs (using the term in its broadest
sense), through new NGOs emerging, and through changes in the mandates
of existing NGOs to include human rights issues or approaches. This may
signal an abrupt volte face in prevailing hegemonies. The inclusion in a
peace agreement of human rights discourse and mechanisms as “part of the
solution,” can signal a dramatic shift from an environment where human
rights NGOs were asserted domestically to be partisan, divisive and
illegitimate, to one where they are seen as a “good thing.” However, use of
the label “human rights” does not signify consensus over what human rights
are, and the international law basis for defining human rights may be
challenged by uninformed, or even overtly political or partisan, definitions.
These are the problems of mainstreaming of human rights, rather than a
problem peculiar to transitions. However, in transition, mainstreaming itself
may happen quickly and dramatically, with emerging debates inextricably
tied up with political struggles over the meaning of the Agreement.
For core mandate human rights NGOs who have existed throughout the
conflict, the emergence of multiple groups which embrace the label
“human rights” raises some difficulties. On one hand, the mainstreaming of
human rights groups and the legitimizing of human rights discourse clearly
constitutes success and the achievement of key goals. Human rights
discourse may create an important space for diverse groups to engage with
each other over the nature of core values. However, a coherent and
informed vision of what constitutes “human rights,” some of the opposi-
tional power of the discourse, and avenues of funding, may all be reduced
or lost.
58. MARY O’RAWE & LINDA MOORE, HUMAN RIGHTS ON DUTY: PRINCIPLES FOR BETTER POLICING—
INTERNATIONAL LESSONS FOR NORTHERN IRELAND (1997).
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One phenomenon post-agreement in Northern Ireland has been the
new-found use of human rights language by a range of different “profession-
als” involved in civil society and in the new human rights institutions.
Another phenomenon has been the increased use of human rights language
by the Protestant/Unionist community, including groups and individuals
who oppose the direction of the peace process and the Belfast Agreement.
Ulster Human Rights Watch (UHRW) was formed after the Agreement, in
opposition to it, with the aim of inputting to the bill of rights process. Their
key demand with regard to the Bill of Rights is that it should prevent
terrorists from entering government, and as a consequence prevent Sinn
Féin’s participation in the power- sharing executive.59 The group, which was
predominantly Protestant/Unionist, grew out of The Long March, a grouping
which represented victims of paramilitary violence who opposed the
direction of the peace process and, in particular, prisoner release.60 UHRW’s
description of why they developed into a human rights group focused on the
Bill of Rights, provides an interesting example both of the power of human
rights discourse but also its malleability:
Politics is dirty, whereas when you talk about human rights the door is opened
like that. People are beginning to realise that they must stand up for themselves
and that they can do it without being ashamed under the title of human rights.
. . . We have believed for many, many years, and in particular for the last three
years, that a lot of pro-union people are totally against the peace process. They
were encouraged to come into the system and participate in it from inside,
under the process. Many pro-unionists decided to do that and have gone into
the process and the process has gobbled them up. The people who didn’t join
it were very vociferous and outside [the process] and they didn’t get anywhere
anyway either. The answer would appear to be that you don’t get involved in
the process unless it is right, but you don’t stand outside and be vociferous
either. You actually do something positive as an alternative to what is there. . . .
We took exactly that view; that human rights was the place to be, and that that
place was in the process.61
New human rights issues will often result in new NGOs to address
them. Furthermore, new human rights mechanisms themselves may create
new forms of activism. In Northern Ireland, provision for an “equality” duty
59. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, The Bill of Rights Proposed by the Ulster Human
Rights Watch (UHRW): A Charter For Democracy (15 Feb. 2004) available at www.
humanrights.uk.net/Charter%20for%20Democracy%20or%20Terrorism%203.php4.
60. Interview with Bertie Campbell, Member, Ulster Human Rights Watch, in Lisburn, N. Ir.
(Mar. 2002) (the Long March deliberately fashioned its strategy around imitating the
1960s civil rights movement march from Derry to Belfast, with a march from Portadown
to Derry).
61. Id.
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aimed at mainstreaming equality issues in governmental decisionmaking
included a provision requiring public bodies to consult with potentially
marginalized groups.62 This completely changed the working practices of
equality NGOs, giving them a whole new process to work with and
expanding the size and importance of those NGOs. It also gave birth to at
least one new equality NGO, the Coalition on Sexual Orientation (CoSO).
The equality duty includes sexual orientation as a relevant category, and
while NGOs in this area existed prior to the Agreement, the consultation
around the role of the new Equality Commission saw the birth of a new
umbrella organization, CoSO, formed as a meeting place for lesbian/gay/
bisexual groups to formulate policy.63 While in the past the problem may
have been getting government to consult, the new equality duty has resulted
in the new problems of making consultation effective.
Peace process funding may itself shape or create the NGO field, and its
relationship with human rights. Some sectors may be funded more than
others, funding may be more or less directive as to the relationship of
sectors to human rights, and funders may make choices as to what types of
human rights work they support, as discussed further below (III, E and IV, C).
D. Changes in “International Players”
Finally, international players may change. The most internal of peace
processes has key international players, many of whom exert pressures
towards human rights. These include, in particular, international human
rights bodies, other states who may act as mediators or exert pressure for
“human rights,” international organizations, international NGOs, interna-
tional “human rights” figures, and funders. International human rights
bodies with specific treaty responsibilities will have an ongoing mandate for
involvement post-agreement. However, international NGOs and organiza-
tions may simply not have the expertise to address detailed reform of local
police or constitutions, and may themselves have complicated internal
processes for deciding whether to move into what are essentially new areas
of work.
More politically controlled forms of human rights intervention may
decrease or be diverted as human rights abuses decrease. Post-agreement
states and international players significant to achieving the human rights
62. See Belfast Agreement, 15 Apr. 1998, § 6 “Human Rights Safeguards and Equality,” ¶ 3;
see also Northern Ireland Act (1998), ¶ 75 & schedule 9.
63. Interview with Barbary Cook, Spokesperson, Coalition on Sexual Orientation, in Belfast,
N. Ir. (May 2002).
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dimension of the agreement may view the conflict as solved, or be forced to
place a conflict lower in their priorities.64 The relevant individuals may
merely get older, more tired, and walk away. In South Africa during the
conflict, moral and financial support from other states for opposition groups,
including those working on human rights issues, was seen as a way of
legitimately supporting the anti-apartheid struggle; human rights support
aimed at government, such as funding for training, was seen as inappropri-
ate.65 Once multi-party elections took place support was diverted to include
governmental justice institutions.
International players may make more subtle shifts as regards human
rights post-agreement. Individuals and states who raised human rights
concerns and asserted the primacy of human rights protections to any
solution to the conflict, may shift the focus of their interventions post-
agreement to “preserving the agreement.” Indeed, it can and will be argued
that “preserving the agreement” is the best way to protect human rights, as
any return to war will collapse new institutions and escalate abuses.
Paradoxically, this shift may mean that the international pressure which
ensured that human rights were written into an agreement may lift post-
agreement. Domestic attempts to essentially re-negotiate human rights
commitments may be enabled by the disengagement of international
players or by their willingness to barter human rights, by linking increased
human rights protections to progress in other areas.
In Northern Ireland, during the negotiations leading to the Belfast
Agreement, both the Irish and American governments asserted the centrality
of human rights to “confidence building,” and this was key to the inclusion
of a human rights stream within the negotiations.66 However, when the IRA
cease-fire collapsed in February 1996, both governments conditioned all-
party negotiations to renewal of the cease-fire67 and often appeared to
condition addressing government human rights abuses on this as well. In
addition to impacting “confidence building” this caused future negotiation
problems for human rights. It undid attempts to reframe human rights issues
64. See INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, LOCAL PERSPECTIVES: FOREIGN AID TO THE
JUSTICE SECTOR (2000) (noting the conflict hopping of donors and problems of sustainability).
65. Id. passim.
66. See, e.g., John Shattuck, Key Note Address, in COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
HUMAN RIGHTS: THE AGENDA FOR CHANGE—HUMAN RIGHTS, THE NORTHERN IRELAND CONFLICT AND THE
PEACE PROCESS 17–22 (1995); see also Report of the International Body on Arms
Decommissioning, 22 Jan. 1996, available at www.cain.ulster.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/
gm24196.htm. Human rights measures began to be formally dealt with under the rubric
of “confidence building” following the Report of the International Body on Arms
Decommissioning that was chaired by Senator George Mitchell. The Report included
some human rights issues in a section entitled “Further Confidence Building.”
67. BELL, supra note 1, at 60–61.
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as cross-community issues related to good governance which it was
reasonable to expect Unionists to accept, rather than merely “concessions
to Nationalists” which could continue to be resisted as such.
International players may have a clearly political vision of why they
support human rights during a conflict, for example because they want to
support a particular community, which then impacts on whether and how
they continue to support human rights issues post peace process. Human
rights NGOs who are seen as key allies during a conflict may come to be
seen as opponents even though articulating consistent positions over time.
Short term international fluctuations in analysis of what is the current
“problem,” impact on who is perceived as holding “solutions.” This can
both help and hurt human rights activists at different points in a peace
process.
E. Changes in Funders and Funding
With a peace process and agreement, permutations of funders and patterns
of funding will themselves change. The significance of funding to the NGO
field already has been mentioned. Funders may stop funding a transitional
jurisdiction altogether, shifting their attention to situations where more
dramatic human rights abuses prevail. This appears to happen less in the
short term than groups sometimes fear. However, as South Africa illustrates,
changes in how funding takes place can be just as significant. Flexible
funding during apartheid delivered outside normal “development” tracks
and directed at civil society post-apartheid was rediverted to “normal”
bilateral aid agreements with government. Assumptions that partnership
agreements would ensure that the government continued to support civil
society, were not always born out in practice, leading to a move away from
this approach further down the line.68 Funders who remain committed in the
medium term will look to local sustainability for the future, and in turn
prompt human rights NGOs to look for other long-term sources of funding,
including service provision funding or governmental sources. Funders may
impose their own notion of what the “real human rights problems” are post
conflict, prompting shifts from civil and political rights to socio-economic
68. Interview with Geoff Budlender, Acting Director of Constitutional Litigation Unit, Legal
Resources Centre, in Cape Town, S. Afr. (Aug. 2003); Interview with Rupert Taylor,
Professor, University of Witswatersrand, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (Aug. 2003); Interview
with Brandon Hamber, supra note 48; Telephone Interview with Gerald Kraak, Human
Rights and Reconciliation Programme Executive, S. Afr., Atlantic Philanthropies (Sept.
2003).
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rights which, while legitimate, may leave civil and political rights prema-
turely abandoned.
Conversely, a new range of funders may arrive as part of a peace
process package. In internationally driven processes the international
community will often work to jump-start civic society as a way of bolstering
local “ownership” of liberal democratic structures which are culturally
“foreign,” as the cases of Bosnia and Cambodia, mentioned below, illustrate
in different ways. International organizations may also see the NGO
community as the only effectively functioning sector post-agreement,
capable of being used as a cheap and speedy way to achieve service
delivery.69 In this situation, an unsustainable explosion of an NGO sector,
entirely dependent on international funding, occurs. Often international
notions of what civic society should look like mesh uneasily with local
notions of what is worthwhile.70
New funders will often come with a pre-set agenda, which may or may
not fit the pattern of needs. These packages are explicitly aimed at building
the peace, but in so doing will work within notions of what it is that builds
the peace, and what it is that undermines it. This may or may not lend
support to human rights activism, but in either case conditions such support
fluctuating and political notions of what it is that builds peace, rather than
acceptance of the need for human rights monitoring as having an ongoing
importance.
“Peace-building” may be defined by the peace agreement and this may
skew priorities in problematic ways; for example, the failure of the Dayton
peace agreement to address gender issues led to difficulties in funding
gender issues, which although eventually addressed, proved difficult to
overcome.71 A “support the agreement” approach to funding can also mean
that NGOs who are against aspects of the process (such as victims opposing
prisoner release), or who do not have much to say about how their work
relates to peace-building (such as NGOs representing minorities other than
the “main” ones), may not benefit. This in turn can affect how groups
approach and present their work.
Even where human rights activism is seen as key to “building the
peace,” funding policies may be problematic. In Cambodia, the UN
69. JULIE MERTUS, WAR’S OFFENSIVE ON WOMEN: THE HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGE IN BOSNIA, KOSOVO, AND
AFGHANISTAN 31–32 (2000).
70. Id. See also Steve Heder & Judy Legerwood, The Politics of Violence: An Introduction,
in PROPAGANDA, POLITICS AND VIOLENCE IN CAMBODIA, DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION UNDER UNITED NATIONS
PEACE-KEEPING 15 (Steve Heder & Judy Legerwood eds., 1996); INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON
HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, supra note 64 (arguing for a “beneficiary perspective” to aid).
71. Madeleine Rees, International Intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Cost of Ignoring
Gender, in THE POST WAR MOMENT: MILITARIES, MASCULINITIES AND INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING,
BOSNIA AND THE NETHERLANDS 51 (Cynthia Cockburn & Dubraka Zarkov eds., 2002).
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Transitional Administration for Cambodia (UNTAC), bolstered human rights
NGOs as a way of combating what they saw as a cultural resistance to the
concept of human rights and a threat to peace-building envisioned interna-
tionally as requiring a move towards liberal democracy.72 International
support for human rights led to some scepticism as to whether involvement
in human rights NGOs represented internalized activism, or local opportun-
ism aimed at fitting the image held out by UNTAC. Paradoxically, funding
for human rights NGOs, coupled with international notions of what a good
human rights NGO looked like, led to a situation where the very pressures
supposed to ensure the internalization of core values became self-negating
as local players presented what they thought international players wanted to
see.73
IV. RESULTANT PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
The changes described above occur throughout a peace process, and are
dramatically consolidated with a peace agreement. They in turn present a
range of new overlapping challenges and problems for human rights NGOs.
These issues appear to be practical, but are generated by the conceptual
dilemmas of the transitional justice landscape, and in particular the nature
of the transitional interface between politics and human rights.
A. Mandate Issues
First and foremost, a human rights NGO may face a question as to whether
it is needed in the new context, whether it should stay open or should close.
Institutions often work towards their own self-preservation but this is not
always so, and not always a good course of action for an NGO. In South
Africa, the United Democratic Front emerged in the late 1980s as a broad
coalition of over 600 anti-apartheid civil, church, labor, and women’s
organizations and organized mass mobilization against apartheid as part of
the pressure for a multi-racial elections. This organization took a conscious
decision to dissolve in 1991 on the basis that its aims had been achieved
with multi-party democracy and the election of the ANC (with whom it was
closely allied) to government, even though some argued that its role could
72. See Heder & Legerwood, supra note 70.
73. Cf. the harsh critique of David Chandler, arguing that there are inevitable anti-
democratic tendencies to foreign-funded civic society, in DAVID CHANDLER, BOSNIA: FAKING
DEMOCRACY AFTER DAYTON 135–53 (1999).
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have mutated and continued to be valuable post-apartheid.74 NGOs may
disappear in ways more subtly related to transition. In Northern Ireland, the
Centre for Research and Documentation (CRD) was formed in 1988 by Irish
people who had worked in conflict situations elsewhere, particularly central
America, to make links between Northern Ireland and these situations,
based on a political analysis of the Northern Ireland conflict as having its
roots in colonialism and denial of human rights. CRD was self-consciously
located in West Belfast and saw its base as being the Republican (predomi-
nantly Catholic) community in which it was located.75 CRD closed in 1998
just after the Agreement. While not ostensibly related to the peace process,
on closer examination its closure had a clear relationship. In the words of a
former staff member:
The organization was destroyed, not by the peace process but because the
context changed so radically. . . . Once there was a transformation in the nature
of the conflict, the way that we had situated ourselves changed so radically that
I don’t think it could be sustained in the same way. . . . A lot of the work that we
did became mainstream. On one level it should have been viewed as a glorious
opportunity to milk that in terms of resourcing, but the other side of that was
that it was not at the cutting edge in the way it had been. . . . Another element
was that there was a withdrawal from internationalism and I think, particularly
in republican communities in the North, there had been a very explicit
international element as part of the conflict. That’s why there were solidarity
murals all over the place and it just wasn’t there after the peace process to the
same degree. Part of that was because people were involved in much more
complex political negotiations, but I think there was certainly a sea-shift in
terms of our own base and in terms of what we were looking at—there was just
less of a dynamic. We found it very hard to get money but I think if we had
skewed the work we were doing we could have done it. If we had pretended
that we were a development education organization (that sometimes we were)
with an interest in the rest of the world, or if we had reinvented ourselves as a
community relations organization that didn’t have a more radical analysis of the
conflict as part of our project, then we could have got funding.76
Slightly less dramatically, a human rights NGO will at least face
questions about the relevance of its mandate, and undergo internal debates
and external challenge as to whether or how that mandate should change.
What generations of human rights abuses should be covered in the new
74. JEREMY SEEKINGS, THE UDF: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1983–
1991 (2000); INEKE VAN KESSEL, “BEYOND OUR WILDEST DREAMS”: THE UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOUTH AFRICA (2000).
75. Interview with Robbie McVeigh, former Research Officer, Centre for Research and
Documentation, in Derry, N. Ir. (Oct. 2001).
76. Id.
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situation: civil and political, or also socio-economic? In South Africa the
delivery of political power and new institutions of democracy delivered
civil and political rights on paper at least. This immediately pointed to
socio-economic rights as a primary focus of future concern, as was
underwritten by the new Constitution’s novel provision for such rights.77
Other mandate questions include whether a new position should be taken
on issues of self-determination with reference to the peace process. What
territory should be monitored? What groups should be monitored? The state
is the most obvious target of monitoring, but what constitutes the state?
Should non-state groupings be monitored as well as the state? Armed
opposition groups, some perhaps with official policing functions, interna-
tional organizations with administrative functions (such as the UN), other
NGO service providers, private companies, or even funders themselves, all
of whom may have quasi-governmental functions, may need to be held
accountable through monitoring. Monitoring these non-state groups will
necessarily take place without the same clarity of applicable international
legal standards as exists with reference to states.
Decisions both to change and to maintain a mandate are fraught with
difficulties. In the Middle East, B’Tselem, a human rights NGO based within
Israeli society with credibility internationally for monitoring human rights
abuses in the Occupied Territories particularly during the first Intifada,
continued its work after the Oslo agreements. By keeping a geographical
mandate which included the occupied territories, it started to monitor the
new Palestinian Authority, as well as Israeli Defense Forces.78 Selective
monitoring of Israeli forces but not Palestinian ones would have quickly led
to challenges of partiality from the Israeli government, the Israeli public, and
the international human rights community. However, monitoring Palestinian
self-government, which itself was a product of Palestinian self-determination
claims for a separate state, was also problematic for an Israeli NGO. While
key Israeli human rights activists anticipated that Oslo would herald
increased co-operation with their Palestinian counter-parts, many key
77. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, §§ 26–29. Interviewees repeatedly stressed the importance of
addressing socio-economic rights. Interview with Teboho Mpondo, Membership Of-
ficer, South African National NGO Coalition, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (Aug. 2003);
Interview with Dinah Maanda, Co-ordinator of Gender Project, Lawyers for Human
Rights, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (Aug. 2003); Interview with Graeme Simpson, supra
note 19; Interview with Venitia Govender, former Director, Human Rights Committee,
in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (Aug. 2003); Interview with Geoff Budlender, supra note 68.
78. See, e.g., B’TSELEM, supra note 34. The current mandate, which appears on the website,
evidences a degree of compromise: “B’Tselem affirms the mandate as monitoring the
activities of the Palestinian Authority affecting human rights,” but states that “as an
Israeli organization, the majority of its efforts is directed at violations committed by our
government on behalf of all of us.” Available at www.btselem.org.
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Palestinian activists viewed the need for most aspects of co-operation as at
an end: at best unnecessary given the existence of several strong Palestinian
human rights NGOs, and at worst, colonial and replicating occupation
itself.79 The territorial scope of the mandate remained the same, and in so
doing the political import changed completely.
B. Prioritizing
Even if the mandate does not change, priorities within that mandate will
change. This will not be a once-off set of changes, but will reflect a constant
need to remain relevant and effective in a rapidly changing and unstable
political context. Changes in the human rights issues, new forms of abuse,
new opportunities for addressing abuses, and changes in the actors, all
prompt consequent changes in the way human rights NGOs work. New
issues will require to be addressed, new relationships built up, and new
types of intervention undertaken. New skill bases will be needed as work
moves from advocacy to lobbying, from confrontation to partnership, and
back again. Abrupt changes in patterns of conflict will require abrupt
changes in the type of work that human rights NGOs do. Fundamental
choices as to whether service provision will be an aspect of work may
present for decision under the pressure either of new needs (such as the
needs of refugees, victims or prisoners), or under the pressure of funders. A
decision to move towards service provision will have an impact on other
areas of work. As an activist from the Coalition on Sexual Orientation
(CoSO) in Northern Ireland describes:
The concept of pure activism in the North has been completely neutralised by
funders. This has led to the creation of service providers who were activists . . .
service provision and activism do not merge. . . . You can make a future if you
develop a training side but you lose your shock value.80
While CoSO provides briefings on equality issues, they made a clear
decision not to undertake broader education work which they felt could
eclipse all other work.81
The impetus of the peace process, together with other developments,
may itself create a form of prioritization. The Pat Finucane Centre (PFC), a
Derry-based human rights group operating within the Irish Nationalist
79. Interviews with Israeli human rights activists (names withheld for confidentiality
reasons), in Jerusalem (July 1999); Interviews with Palestinian human rights activists, in
Ramallah and Jerusalem (July 1999).
80. Interview with Barbary Cook, supra note 63.
81. Id.
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(predominantly Catholic) community found that some areas of work
disappeared and other areas of work grew. Their conflict-focus on trying to
stimulate cross-community engagement on human rights issues became
unnecessary given that this dialogue was taking place relatively easily post-
peace process and agreement. However, work with families whose relatives
had been killed by security forces or by loyalists with alleged security force
collusion dramatically increased. This was in part because judgements from
the European Court of Human Rights had opened new lines of activism.82
However, the peace process had also played a part, both in providing new
mechanisms such as the Police Ombudsman’s office, and by creating a
particular space and a particular need:
The whole context of the cease-fire affected victims in both positive and negative
ways. Positively, victims now feel more free to ask questions due to a lack of fear.
Negatively, the entire nature of debate around policing and decommissioning
which dominates the political developments emphasises to victims of state
violence that their story has never been told. They are being left out of the
picture while the RUC [Royal Ulster Constabulary] get the George Cross.83
The Belfast-based CAJ, who had played a key role in the mainstreaming
of human rights in the Agreement, noted that to some extent the Agreement
created its own set of priorities.84 Accordingly, the aims and priorities of the
organization had become more focused on the achievement of the human
rights commitments in the Agreement. As one staff member put it: “there is a
clear agenda which hopefully we contributed to creating, but that means we
have a responsibility to address it; we can’t just walk away from it; more
importantly, it has created a whole new political space in which to have these
discussions.”85 CAJ’s response to the Agreement marked a partial shift from
lobbying for changes to monitoring implementation of agreed upon changes.
However, interestingly, CAJ also noted that the human rights changes had not
in practice been as radical as had at first been thought, meaning that radical
changes to mandate and focus had not been as central a feature of their own
organizational planning as they had anticipated.86 In particular, the CAJ noted
82. Jordan v. The United Kingdom, no. 24746/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2001-III (unpublished);
McKerr v. The United Kingdom, no. 28883/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2001-III (published); Kelly
& others v. The United Kingdom, no. 30054/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2001-III (unpublished);
Shanaghan v. The United Kingdom, no. 37715/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2001-III (unpublished)
(all cases available at www.echr.coe.int).
83. Interview with Paul O’Connor, Project Co-ordinator, Pat Finucane Centre, in Derry,
N. Ir. (Oct. 2001).
84. Interview with Martin O’Brien, Director, Committee on the Administration of Justice, in
Belfast, N. Ir. (Nov. 2001).
85. Interview with Maggie Beirne, supra note 57.
86. Interview with Martin O’Brien, supra note 84.
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that the resistance of the civil service to change had proved an obstacle in
implementing the Agreement’s human rights commitments.87
Again, attempts to prioritize reveal the changing politics of human
rights activism in a transitional situation. In South Africa it is difficult to find
human rights NGO monitoring of civil and political rights and issues such as
death in custody, arbitrary execution, and torture despite the fact that these
things clearly occur.88 The explanation of a South African activist reflects not
only the importance of socio-economic rights post-transition, but complex
underlying assumptions about the relationship of human rights activism to
conflict. When questioned about the civil and political rights gap in South
Africa, he noted that in one sense “civil and political rights were quite well
protected.”89 When challenged about ongoing issues of lethal force and
torture he explained:
The socio-economic disparity is the biggest apparent problem, and one of the
major consequences of that is crime. Beside AIDS, the issue which is probably
impeding on our country the most, impeding investment and stopping tourism,
is violent crime. I think you would find that the vast majority of Africans, black
and white, including those who were heavily involved in the issue of the way
in which the police used to do things, are so angry about the violent crime and
how it is destroying the country that we are inclined almost to overlook and
forget what is happening on that level. There is almost an attitude that these hi-
jackers, these criminals, almost deserve what they get and that police need to
take a hard line. . . . Prior to 1994 it was easy to identify the enemy and throw
everything at them, because one was fighting for a just cause. . . . When I was
with Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, if three robbers were killed we
would have immediately called in witnesses . . . we were there to monitor and
to call for an investigation and a prosecution. Now there is an acceptance that
if these robbers were shot and they are armed, they deserved to get shot, . . .
No-one is doing monitoring and it is amazing.90
C. Funding Issues
Changes in the funding base will affect the priorities and even the existence
of human rights NGOs, as has been touched on already. While these
changes affect civic society in general, there are particular implications for
87. Id.
88. The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) provides a partial
exception, in particular with its monitoring of the Independent Complaints Directorate’s
investigations of deaths in custody.
89. Interview with Brian Currin, former Director, Lawyers for Human Rights, in Belfast,
N. Ir. (May 2002).
90. Id.
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changes in the funding base for human rights NGOs. New sources of funding
may need to be accessed for the new types of work, such as work in South
Africa around socio-economic rights and issues such as HIV infection.
Decisions will have to be taken as to what sources of new funding are
appropriate for a human rights NGO—those explicitly tied to political
projects such as the success of the peace process, those requiring service
provision, or those which require matching government funds, may compro-
mise independence, in particular with regard to advocacy work. Moreover,
core human rights activity, such as monitoring, reporting, and lobbying may
not easily fit into the “project” funding model which funders hold out. For an
NGO, obtaining funding may involve a complex game of working within the
funder’s notions of what is valuable, while trying to undertake quite different
work which the NGO views as valuable. Julie Mertus notes in Bosnia a
practice whereby local women became savvy about the aid process,
adopting a “take the money and do what you have to do” approach.91 As one
activist in Northern Ireland put it, “When you get funding you need an exit
plan—how do you use the funding to develop another new project?”92
Reliance on international funding coupled with local suspicion over interna-
tional agendas may play into the hands of political opposition to the work of
human rights NGOs, as already illustrated.93 Finally, funding patterns and
funders’ ideas of what issues are important may mean that human rights gaps
occur, such as around civil and political rights.
Funders may also cause organizational changes such as increased
training, clearer line management, and fuller accounting processes, both
directly by conditioning funding on them and indirectly by the technicality
of their application processes.94 This is not always valuable for local NGOs.
Mertus documents how NGOs in Bosnia were routinely required to undergo
“culturally inappropriate training” as a condition of funding.95 Avila Kilmurray,
the Director of Northern Ireland Voluntary Trust (NIVT), a major local
conduit of peace process funding, noted how increased bureaucracy had
made it harder rather than easier for smaller groups to get funding.96
91. MERTUS, supra note 69, at 30; see also, Pearce, supra note 21, at 613–14.
92. Interview with Human Rights Activist, in Belfast, N. Ir. (Mar. 2002).
93. See Ian Smillie, At Sea in a Sieve? Trends and Issues in the Relationship Between
Northern NGOs and Northern Governments, in STAKEHOLDERS: GOVERNMENT-NGO PARTNER-
SHIPS FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 6, 13–14 (Ian Smillie & Henny Helmich eds., 1999).
94. Interview with Brian Currin, supra note 89.
95. MERTUS, supra note 69, at 29.
96. Interview with Avila Kilmurray, Director, The Community Foundation for Northern
Ireland, in Belfast, N. Ir. (Mar. 2002) (The Community Foundation for Northern Ireland
was previously called The Northern Ireland Voluntary Trust. Avila Kilmurray served as
Director of The Northern Ireland Voluntary Trust prior to the name change.).
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Key questions must be asked about funders’ approaches to sustainability,
and how funders should marry their own ambitions as regards human rights
with locally perceived needs and notions of effective action. Many com-
mentators have noted how international funding often fails to capacity build
or to create self-sustaining groups.97 Some have even argued that such
funding shifts civic society in an anti-democratic direction by creating and
sustaining groups who do not have to make their case to politicians or
popular opinion.98 This connects to a broader debate over the accountabil-
ity of civic society itself, and suggestions that nongovernmental organiza-
tions have a “democratic deficit” which impacts their legitimacy and which
requires remedy.99
However, the question must be asked as to whether core mandate
human rights groups can or should aim to be accountable to a representa-
tive constituency, and if so, what this accountability would look like. While
there are ways of popularizing campaigns, which human rights groups use,
often the starting point is one of popular opposition. As Ian Smillie argues,
The problem for many NGOs is not a lack of accountability, but balancing
accountabilities, and keeping the ultimate impact of their work at the top of the
agenda. While it is the beneficiaries to whom the accountability is pledged, the
greatest effort to explain, report and justify is usually made to the donor in the
North, both individual and institutional.100
The question of accountability in turn has funding implications. Core
mandate human rights groups, unlike some other elements of civic society,
usually cannot look to government to resource its oppositional work.
Indeed, one problem for human rights NGOs in obtaining funding is the fact
that funders often will not have squarely addressed the tensions between
civic society directions and the directions of elected politicians. In Northern
Ireland, NIVT director Avila Kilmurray noted an increased difficulty in
funding issues which were controversial, such as with abortion legislation,
in a context of devolution of power to an elected Assembly.
97. See, e.g., MERTUS, supra note 69.
98. CHANDLER, supra note 73, at 135–53.
99. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of
International Nongovernmental Organizations and the Idea of International Civil Society,
11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 91 (2000); Gordenker & Weiss, supra note 11; MERTUS, supra note 69;
Julie Mertus, From Legal Transplants to Transformative Justice: Human Rights and the
Promise of Transnational Civil Society, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1335 (1999); SANGOCO/
INTERFUND, supra note 41; Smillie, supra note 93; Van Tuijl, supra note 13.
100. Smillie, supra note 93, at 21 (emphasis in original). See INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN
RIGHTS POLICY, DESERVING TRUST: ISSUES OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS NGOS, DRAFT REPORT
FOR CONSULTATION (2003) for a more detailed discussion of the concept of accountability
for human rights NGOs.
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I would have held that one of the claims for NIVT’s credibility as an
independent funder came from the fact that in the 1980s we funded those
groups that were blacklisted by government. We probably find it harder to do
that now with local government coming out of the Good Friday Agreement. . . .
In the 1980s you could say that we were doing it within a democratic deficit.
When we actually have an elected democracy then taking independent action
is less acceptable particularly when that elected democracy is itself still rather
tenuous. People don’t want to be seen to be undermining it, for the best
reasons. So, for argument’s sake, we would have funded groups around some of
the abortion legislation debates. Taking that as an example, it is probably easier
to do that in a situation where you have direct rule than in a situation where
99% of the [Northern Ireland] Assembly votes “no” about it, in that local
politicians will then say, “who are you to oppose us when we are the elected
representatives?”101
Human rights are likely to remain contentious during and post-
transition. Studies have shown the “safe-aid” tendency of funders who
consider some areas safer than others, even within the area of justice.102
One study notes a South African beneficiary’s observation that “donors
neglect prisons and prosecutors and opt for ‘safe courts and trendy
police.’”103 A study of NGOs in Central America similarly notes how the
more “political” NGOs can be marginalized by larger donors, or made the
subject of donor capacity-building projects.104 Safe-aid approaches militate
against hard-hitting advocacy work.
D. Personnel Issues
The changes in human rights issues and political context may manifest
themselves in a series of personnel issues for human rights NGOs. The
mainstreaming of human rights would seem to create the possibility of a
broader based constituency from which to draw staff. However, in practice
human rights NGOs may be more likely to face difficulties in staff
recruitment. They may lose highly qualified leaders to the new political and
legal structures. This happened particularly in South Africa where, post-
elections, many able black lawyers moved into politics, private business, or
national human rights institutions.105 In combination with other factors this
101. Interview with Avila Kilmurray, supra note 96.
102. See Smillie, supra note 93, at 21.
103. INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, supra note 44, at 41.
104. Pearce, supra note 21, at 612.
105. Cheyenne Church & Anna Visser, Civil Society in Transition and the Role of Civic
Forums (INCORE ed., n.d.) (copy on file with authors); Interview with Geoff Budlender,
supra note 68; see generally SANGOCO/INTERFUND, supra note 41.
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had the side effect of leaving white people over-represented in the
leadership of human rights NGOs precisely when they had to police the first
majority black government. Interestingly, as time progresses, there is some
evidence of a reverse trend with people, somewhat disillusioned with their
capacity to effect positive change in government and civil service, returning
to NGOs.106
Human rights NGOs may lose personnel to politics in a more general
sense—not to political structures or parties, but to the changed politics of
what it means to be a human rights activist in the new context. In the words
of a former director of a human rights NGO in South Africa:
I felt that after 1994, due to the association that I had with the liberation
movement and the new structures within the country, that it would be very
difficult for me to absolutely objectively and honestly play the role that I had
played prior to 1994 against the same people that were very much my
colleagues and comrades. So I wasn’t sure that my discretion would be
completely honest and unfettered. The other consideration was that I felt that
the particular position that I occupied in the new South Africa should be held by
a person of colour, because I was concerned that the moment one started to
take up difficult and contentious issues it would be very easy to discredit the
view by a white liberal who was now shouting the odds, and that could
undermine the message and the lobby. Plus I felt that the position should in any
case be held by a person of colour.107
Human rights promoters have been likened to “moral entrepreneurs,”
articulating a moral and ethical vision for society which is not yet accepted.
Personal motivation for getting involved in this type of work usually relates
to a vision of progressive social change. As human rights are mainstreamed
those who see themselves as entrepreneurial in this way may themselves
move to new agendas as representing a new dynamic for further change.
Furthermore, if human rights mechanisms are not implemented, or inad-
equately established, the resulting “wasted time” of engaging in the
bureaucratic game-playing required to demonstrate that they are not
working effectively can be demoralizing. As one activist in Northern
Ireland, commenting on the ineffectiveness of new human rights institu-
tions, put it, “there is a real loss of direction, and a loss of the belief in the
ability to transform anything at all.”108
Human right activists, like others, get old. Peace processes, even when
successful, last many years. Life is short, and a fifteen-year-old cease-fire
means a new generation with no experience of conflict or its abuses, and a
106. Interview with Brandon Hamber, supra note 48.
107. Interview with Brian Currin, supra note 89.
108. Interview with Robbie McVeigh, supra note 75.
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generation of young adults who remember it through a child’s eyes. Many
people get involved in human rights work through exposure to human rights
abuses. As a consequence, new generations may direct their human rights
energies towards the abuses that they see around them, and new areas of
activism, such as environmentalism or anti-globalization, rather than
building institutions designed to address a conflict which is a memory more
than a lived experience. Human rights NGOs under pressure of work are
often not good at institution building or preserving institutional memory,
and, when work is going well and evolving organically around clear human
rights violations, will not see the need for organizational development, or
will not have time or funding to undertake it. Personnel changes may lead
to an organization having to re-invent itself, not knowing why it took certain
actions in the past, and losing the experience of its own trial and error as
regards effective interventions.
Increases in personnel also have management implications for an
organization. Organizations which were dependent on voluntary contribu-
tions, both financial and in kind through volunteer staffing, move to a
system of paid workers. Those with organizational history and evidenced
long-term commitment to the issues can lose out to paper qualified NGO
professionals whose commitment is questioned. Staff and management lines
between volunteers which were flexible and relatively flat managerially,
will need to be made more hierarchical with clearer management roles
emerging, possibly causing new organizational tensions.
E. Inter-Organizational Issues
Inter-organizational issues may also impact the work of human rights
NGOs. These changes can be positive. In Northern Ireland, the Agreement’s
human rights mechanisms have enabled new inter-communal relationships.
In particular, the Equality duty and the Bill of Rights project have generated
some broad-based, rainbow coalitions across sectarian and other divides,
most notably an Equality Coalition and an Ad Hoc Bill of Rights Consor-
tium. The Bloody Sunday Trust, established to lobby for justice for the
relatives of those killed by British Soldiers in 1972, noted that it was easier
to engage in cross community dialogue since the peace process and the
establishment of a new Bloody Sunday Inquiry.109 Similarly, the Bogside
Resident’s Group, a group from a Nationalist/Republican community who
oppose “Apprentice Boys” (Protestant) marches through their district, noted
109. Interview with Patricia McBride, Manager, Bloody Sunday Trust, in Derry, N. Ir. (Jan.
2002).
2004 Problems of Transition 369
the positive impact of the peace process on how they mediated the rights
issues at the center of this marching dispute. One activist argued that as a
result they:
were more committed to a long term resolution of the [marching] issue. We
know this is about relationships between communities, it is about people’s
rights. So it is not about some sort of victory, it is about trying to come out with
a win-win situation for everyone . . . the fact that there is a political process
there encourages groups like ourselves to try for a similar situation where you
can actually see that a negotiation process can work. . . . The process has given
us space to engage with people within the unionist community. Ten years ago
we would not have got that, but more and more people within the Unionist
community are willing to become engaged and to talk about issues.110
However, more negative inter-organization issues can also emerge. The
expanding field of groups operating under the human rights banner may
create competition for funding. Often more significant to the work of core
mandate human rights NGOs is the emerging struggle over the meaning and
content of “human rights work.” As everything becomes “human rights” so
the term loses the power it once had. Core mandate human rights NGOs
will want to avoid categorizing other groups as “proper” human rights
NGOs or not, but similarly will want to maintain a notion of human rights
as based on international standards. Accordingly, embracing groups who
raise human rights concerns in ways that are antithetical to human rights
principles, for example, because they are being used to underwrite
supremacist/racist claims or who are explicitly politically aligned, will be
problematic. However, opposing these groups and articulating why may be
itself inappropriately political, may undermine a move towards human
rights discourse which can be worked with, and may open groups up to
accusations of rivalry, possessiveness, and control.
Within and between organizations who worked together during the
conflict, relationships which seemed well cemented may come under strain
post-agreement. These strains cut across relationships in many different
ways, and, it is argued here, must be understood as reflecting structural
problems rather than merely inter-personal ones. The Israeli/Palestinian
conflict provides an example of the cross-cutting currents whereby the
impetus for organic contacts and friendships between Palestinians and
Israelis supportive of Palestinian human rights was removed, through the
changing nature of activism and through the political re-situating of the
meaning of cross community relationships. During the first intifada radical
110. Interview with Donncha MacNiallais, Spokesperson, Bogside Residents Group, in
Derry, N. Ir. (Jan. 2002).
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Israeli activists and lawyers worked in partnership with Palestinian activists
and lawyers around a range of issues, particularly when recourse to Israeli
courts was needed. However, the structures of Oslo removed the need for
much of this co-operation. For example, Israel’s reduced use of administra-
tive detention reduced the need for co-operation over legal challenges to it;
other issues such as family reunification were adjudicated post-Oslo to be
beyond the jurisdiction of the Israeli High Court.
Similarly, co-operation between Palestinians in occupied territories and
Palestinians or Arab Israelis within pre-1967 borders also became more
difficult after Oslo. Lisa Hajjar notes the “green line mentality” whereby
Palestinians within pre-1967 boundaries and Palestinians within occupied
territories saw little reason to cooperate.111 Coupled with this, the provision
in the Oslo accords for Norwegian funded “people-to-people” projects
aimed at building relationships between Israelis and Palestinians also
changed the political meaning of Israeli/Palestinian relationships. Some
activists (both Palestinian and Israeli) viewed people-to-people contacts as
bolstering Israeli attempts to “normalize” occupation through the interim
accords and “paying Palestinians to play at peace.”112 Groups whose work
had focused on building up contacts deliberately changed direction, while
other groups whose commitment to such contacts, and indeed to the peace
process, was tenuous, applied for funding.113
V. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE REVISITED:
THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES
The discussion thus far illustrates the increased difficulty of navigating the
relationship between rights and politics in a transitional environment.
However, any “before the peace agreement” and “after the peace agree-
ment” analysis can be charged with being somewhat artificial. It bears
reiteration that human rights NGOs have complex relationships with
politics both during conflict and indeed in a more straightforward liberal
democratic setting. However, in both situations there are fairly well-
accepted methods of working for human rights NGOs which obscure this
relationship and present it as largely unproblematic. Centrally, in both
111. Lisa Hajjar, Cause Lawyering in Transnational Perspective: National Conflict and
Human Rights in Israel/Palestine, 31 L. & SOC. REV. 473 (1997).
112. Interviews with Israeli human rights activists, supra note 79; interviews with Palestinian
human rights activists, supra note 79.
113. Interview with People-to-People administrator (name withheld for confidentiality
reasons), in Ramallah (July 1999).
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situations what is perceived as the “political” sphere of operation and what
is perceived as the “human rights” sphere of operation appears obvious.
Difficult questions of the role of human rights within the broader political
context, and the extent to which rights are prior values or instrumental to
some other end, are left to academic theorists. During a transitional
situation political, military, and human rights changes leave the rights and
politics interface exposed and contested, placing questions about the
relationship of human rights to conflict center stage. A constant interroga-
tion of how “human rights” issues relate or not to “ending the conflict,” and
whether they should, plays out in sub-issues of what human rights issues are
important post-agreement and what the relationship to the new political
dispensation should be.
A peace process and peace agreement offer real and undeniable
opportunities for improving human rights protections and reducing conflict.
Most human rights NGOs recognize this and find creative ways of surviving
a peace process, positively influencing it, and playing a coherent role as
regards post-agreement peace-building. In Northern Ireland CAJ provides a
good example of an NGO which maintained a monitoring and advocacy
role that responded to the changing patterns of conflict while also using its
expertise in human rights abuses towards contributing thought-out sugges-
tions for structural changes aimed at preventing those abuses. A key
dynamic was the organization’s ongoing internal strategizing as to how the
peace process might enable change, and how human rights issues could be
inserted into a peace process then framed around a clash of sovereign
aspirations. Public debate was also an important element of the strategy.
The organization held a conference in 1995 which produced a report
entitled “Agenda for Change” which brainstormed five key areas where
change was thought more likely as a result of the peace process: policing,
criminal justice/emergency legislation, equality, bill of rights, and dealing
with the past.114 The first four of these were addressed in the eventual Belfast
Agreement.115 In the area of equality, CAJ work focused on nurturing an
equality coalition which included representatives from Protestant, Catholic,
and a range of other marginalized communities. This group demonstrated
how equality issues cut across the traditional Protestant/Catholic division,
and in so doing contributed to the implementation of a new equality duty.
Through both the substantive change pushed for and the methods of
lobbying, the CAJ was able to use the concept of human rights to provide
114. COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS: AGENDA FOR CHANGE: HUMAN RIGHTS,
THE NORTHERN IRELAND CONFLICT AND THE PEACE PROCESS (1995).
115. For detailed discussion of why the “right to truth” was not included see Christine Bell,
Dealing with the Past in Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1095 (2003).
Vol. 26372 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
substance to what “conflict resolution” might look like. In proffering
institutional change which offered practical non-violent avenues for dealing
with issues at the heart of the conflict, these strategies turned the oft-asserted
clash between principle and pragmatism on its head.
There are also clear threats for human rights NGOs in the post-
agreement environment. Throughout a peace process, and consequent to a
peace agreement, a human rights NGO will in effect find itself in a change
management situation forced on it by external forces. The pace of post-
agreement change will be dramatic, and the direction and results of the
process uncertain and unpredictable. There is often little the NGO can do to
plan for these changes. Furthermore, the drama of the situation may mean
that the time available for self-reflection as to the nature of the changes and
how best to handle them is limited. At the very time when new opportuni-
ties present themselves, often reflecting the fruition of years of human rights
campaigns, the NGO may find itself beset by internal strife with relation-
ships and coalitions forged in the darkest days of the conflict imploding.
Human rights activists do not stand outside of the conflict immune to its
human cost, indeed often they are particularly immersed in it. Personal
issues of burn-out, stress, trauma, and illness may emerge with human rights
defenders as with other conflict victims, compounding organizational
problems. Quarrels over mandate, priorities, the relationship of the work to
the political context, funding, salaries, corruption, and leadership may turn
what appeared to be a highly functional and effective NGO into an
apparently dysfunctional one. The structural causes can be left unanalyzed
in the downward spiral of inter-personal recriminations accompanied by
flight of funders. One final point to note is that all this applies when the
peace process is relatively successful. Where the process is unsuccessful,
human rights activists reeling from the above changes will find themselves
plunged into reactive work, and often particularly under physical attack, not
least because they have played a more visible “political” role during the
process. The destruction of human rights NGO offices by the Israeli Defense
Forces upon the break-down of the Oslo Middle East peace process stands
as evidence.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The opportunities and dangers of transitions for human rights NGOs suggest
a number of initial responses for both human rights NGOs and those who
would support them in funder or academic communities. First and foremost,
all those actors concerned with human rights protection, internal and
external, should recognize that a peace process contains both opportunities
and threats for the protection of human rights. It should be recognized that
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many of these opportunities and threats cannot be appropriately planned
for, and that difficulties and mistakes are inevitable. Accordingly, perhaps
the best human rights NGOs can do is to have an open approach to their
mandate and priorities which enables flexibility. They can perhaps do little
more than to build internal planning processes which enable them to be
self-reflective about their role and what they can achieve in a peace process
context. This involves anticipating possible opportunities and problems and
creating time and space to step back to evaluate “the big picture.” Funders
and other external actors also need to be particularly sensitive to the
problems for human rights NGOs in transition. The risks for funders are
huge, but often are less so than for actors on the ground. Funders should
recognize the complexities of the transitional landscape for human rights
work, and that this will pose strain on human rights NGOs. Funders and
other external supporters of human rights NGOs should recognize the long-
term nature of the peace-building project, and that walking away from it
may undo gains, with consequences for any peaceful settlement. Apparent
NGO “disfunctionalism” should not result in quick withdrawal of funds, but
assessment of the further support necessary.116 Both NGOs and funders
should continue to recognize the importance of ongoing monitoring of both
civil and political rights post-transition, and that the need for such
monitoring will not be negated by regime change, even to the most “human
rights friendly” government.
The above study also indicates that legal developments could assist the
implementation of human rights protections. First, further development of
the “Fundamental Standards of Humanity” could assist monitoring by
bridging the transition gap between human rights and humanitarian law
which arises as conflict wanes.117 Furthermore, some of the difficulties
116. Cf. Michael Shifter, Weathering the Storm: NGOs Adapting to Major Political Transi-
tions, in MANY ROADS TO JUSTICE: THE LAW RELATED WORK OF FORD FOUNDATION GRANTEES AROUND
THE WORLD 337 (Ford Found. ed., 2000).
117. See Advisory Services In The Field of Human Rights, U.N. ESC, Comm’n on Hum. Rts.,
54th Sess., Agenda Item 17 & Add. 1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/97 (1998); Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights: Fundamental standards of humanity, Report of the
Secretary-General submitted pursuant to Commission resolution 1998/29, U.N. ESC,
Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 55th Sess., Agenda Item 17, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/92 (1998);
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Fundamental standards of humanity, Report
of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to Commission resolution 1999/65, U.N.
ESC, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 56th Sess., Agenda Item 17, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/94
(1999); Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Letter dated 30 March 2000 from
the head of the delegation of Sweden to the fifty-sixth session of the Commission on
Human Rights, addressed to the Chairman of the Commission of Human Rights, U.N.
ESC, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 56th Sess., Agenda Item 17, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/145
& Res. 2000/69 (2000); Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Fundamental
standards of humanity, Report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to Commis-
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around the relationship between international NGOs and local human
rights NGOs could perhaps be progressed through codes of practice aimed
at integrating beneficiary perspectives into funding decisions.118 Funders
should examine their relationship to those funded, recognizing that funders
do not stand outside the conflict but shape priorities, adopt particular
analyses of conflict resolution which local players interact with, and even
create and shape the field of local players itself. Finally, institutional reform
in times of transition remains relatively little explored. Further comparative
studies on human rights commissions, change in policing, criminal justice
reform, and judicial reform are vital. Conflict situations have often evolved
vibrant and transnational civic groups. Paradoxically, during a peace
process the very specificity of negotiations often localizes issues, even for a
civic society with a transnational approach and international networks. As a
consequence, “legal transplants” are often the result of imposition by
international mediators.119 Working towards transnational interchange which
facilitates civic society to fashion “legal transplants” in an organic and
creative way would not only stand a better chance of producing effective
institutional change, but could prove a useful solidarity tool during the
particularly dark days which occur in any peace process—days which can
crush hope in a way which outright conflict did not.
sion on Human Rights decision 2001/112, U.N. ESC, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 58th Sess.,
Agenda Item 17, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/103 (2001); see also Jean-Daniel Vigney &
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THE RED CROSS 917, 917–38 (2000).
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